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The Role of the Article III Judge
Thomas B. Griffith

T

he Constitution says precious little about the role envisioned for
federal judges in the new government that document created: “The
judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at
stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office.”1
The framers’ brevity in writing that description may be one reason
that there has been a vigorous debate over the scope and content of this
“judicial power” since the founding of the Republic. (Indeed, that debate
was a major feature of the 2020 presidential election campaign and led
to President Biden’s creation of the Commission on the Supreme Court,
on which I served.)
Determining a judge’s role under the Constitution is central to the
successful working of the separated powers which are the hallmark of
the government the framers created. Some argue that they are a more
important guarantor of our liberties than even the Bill of Rights and
the Civil War Amendments.2 And yet we live in a time when the roles
1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
2. “Justice Scalia expounded on what sets the United States apart from other countries: not the Bill of Rights, which ‘every banana republic has,’ but the separation of powers.” Emmarie Huetteman, “Breyer and Scalia Testify at Senate Judiciary Hearing,” New
York Times, October 6, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/us/politics/breyer
-and-scalia-testify-at-senate-hearing.html.
BYU Studies Quarterly 61, no. 1 (2022)233

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2022

1

234

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 21

BYU Studies Quarterly

assigned to our public officials under the Constitution seem of less
interest to people than whether those officials’ decisions align with the
citizenry’s favored outcomes. We seem not to care as much about who
decides what we want achieved—be it the president, the Congress, or
the judiciary—as we care that it simply gets done!
In his 2020 book, A Time to Build, Yuval Levin bemoans the corrosive
effect on civil society from this lack of interest in the roles we are called
to play. As Levin sees it, we have lost sight of a question that is central to
the success of the institutions that give life to civil society: “Given my role
here, how should I act?”3 Too many officeholders seem less interested in
the role they are to play within the institution in which they serve than
they are in using that institution as a platform on which to perform.4
From 2005 to 2020, I was one of the “Judges” on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, one of the “inferior Courts” that the Constitution authorized Congress to create. In this essay, I will use my
experience to attempt to explain my understanding of the nature of the
“judicial power” my colleagues and I were commissioned to use.
I
Although it was far from a pleasant experience, the Senate’s confirmation
of my nomination as a circuit judge by President George W. Bush was
smooth sailing compared to the tempestuous proceedings others have
endured. For that I am grateful. In fact, I was surprised that I was not
asked some hard questions, which in hindsight seem indispensable to the
Senate’s properly performing its constitutional duty to give the president
“advice and consent” on his judicial nominations.5 For e xample, I should
have been asked my views on how a judge ought to interpret the Constitution (“Are you an originalist, a legal realist, a believer in the ‘living Constitution’”?), read statutes (“Do you favor Eskridge’s ‘dynamic’ interpretation,
or are you a textualist?”), and apply regulations (“Is Chevron deference an
abdication of the judicial role or a properly deferential response to a delegation of legislative power from the Congress to the executive branch?”).
I don’t recall a single question along any of those lines. Except one.

3. Yuval Levin, A Time to Build: From Family and Community to Congress and the
Campus, How Recommitting to Our Institutions Can Revive the American Dream (New
York: Basic Books, 2020), 168.
4. Levin, Time to Build, 33–34.
5. U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
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That question came early in the process, even before the president
had nominated me. I was invited to the White House to interview with
Alberto Gonzales, counsel to President Bush, and several of his colleagues in the West Wing. The interview went well, and I was told afterwards that it would be helpful to my chances of being nominated by the
president if I could show that I would have the support of the Republican
and Democratic Senate leaders I had worked for as Senate legal counsel,
the nonpartisan chief legal officer of the United States Senate.
I went immediately to see Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, who, I was happy to learn, was willing to be an enthusiastic supporter. Next was a visit with Senator Harry
Reid, then the whip of the Democratic conference, who was similarly
encouraging. Senator Reid insisted that I meet with Democratic leader
Senator Tom Daschle. I had come to know Senator Daschle well during
my service as Senate legal counsel, and we both respected and liked one
another. As is often the case when meeting with a busy senator, especially when not part of his planned schedule, I had to wait for a while in
his office before seeing him.
Upon learning that I was waiting to see Senator Daschle, his chief
of staff kindly invited me into his own office for a pleasant reunion in
which we recalled projects we had worked on together. Senator Daschle
briefly joined us, greeting me with a warm hug as he voiced his pleasure
that I was under consideration by the president for an appointment to
the D.C. Circuit. It was all very heady stuff. But there was another person
in the room whom I did not know personally. He had not been on Senator Daschle’s staff while I served the Senate. I did know, however, that he
was the architect of the Democrats’ strategy to filibuster some of President Bush’s judicial nominees, including the nominee whose withdrawal
from consideration created an opening for me.
When Senator Daschle left the room, this staffer started asking me
questions to probe who I was and what I was about. It was during that
conversation that the tough question came.
Predictably, he asked me which judge had most shaped my thinking
about the law.
“John Marshall,” I said. A safe answer, I assumed.
Then he added, “Other than John Marshall.”
I paused for a moment. The answer was Robert Bork, but I hesitated to confess this to the architect of the Democrats’ filibuster strategy.
Bork was anathema to progressives. Many senators carried scars from
his confirmation battle. With more than a little anxiety, I answered

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2022

3

236

BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2022], Art. 21

BYU Studies Quarterly

truthfully. “Bork. Robert Bork. I agree with his views about the role
of a judge. The judge is bound to follow the law as ratified in the Constitution, enacted by Congress, or promulgated by the executive with
authority delegated by Congress. And the judge is to apply the law neutrally, not favoring an outcome just because it aligns with his favored
political position or his own sensibilities about what is fair and just.”
Apparently sensing my anxiety, the staffer assured me that my answer
was acceptable. “Don’t worry, Tom. We understand that President Bush
gets to appoint conservatives to the bench.”
Emboldened by that response, I declared myself an acolyte of Bork
throughout the confirmation process. It must have worked. I was confirmed by the Senate and appointed by the president.
II
A few months later, I found myself, as a judge on the D.C. Circuit, being
asked to render decisions in cases raising a host of issues I had never
thought about deeply before. Some involved determinations that would
affect only the litigants, such as whether the Federal Aviation Administration had wrongly stripped a license from a commercial pilot.6 Others
had a broader and more consequential reach, such as whether a dying
child had a Constitutional right to use promising experimental drugs
that had not yet run the gauntlet of the approval process required by
the Food and Drug Administration,7 the power of the police to use GPS
to track the movements of a suspect without a warrant,8 whether the
Second Amendment recognized an individual right to use a firearm
for self-defense at home9 and elsewhere,10 and the legality of the detentions in Guantanamo Bay.11 As I worked through these and other cases, I
began to wonder whether I should have read more than Bork to help me
understand my role.
A federal judge can supplement his salary only by writing books and
teaching classes at law schools. I love the classroom and so opted for that
6. Casino Airlines, Inc. v. NTSB, 439 F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
7. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,
495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
8. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
9. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
10. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
11. For example, see Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 522–27 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(Griffith, J., concurring in part); Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Griffith,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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course. Dean Kevin J. Worthen was kind enough to offer me the chance
to teach at Brigham Young University’s law school. He also generously
allowed me to choose the courses I would teach. I decided to take this
opportunity and read more than Bork. I have now taught a course on the
role of the Article III judge every academic year since 2008, first at BYU,
then at Stanford, and now at Harvard. At the beginning of the course,
I tell my students that I started my service as a judge committed to Bork’s
views, but that I wanted to use this course to test whether that was a
commitment I should keep. After grounding ourselves in Bork’s writings, we bring on his sympathizers and challengers and study the history. We read the views of Antonin Scalia, Benjamin Cardozo, Stephen
Breyer, Cass Sunstein, Ronald Dworkin, and other thoughtful judges
and scholars.
It has been an exhilarating experience, but in the first few years, it
was a troubling one. Prior to teaching the course, I had been persuaded
by Bork’s insistence that a judge is bound by the terms of the Constitution as they were understood by those who ratified them. A judge is
not free to “update” the Constitution to make its provisions align with
more modern sensibilities. We leave that to We, the People, through the
amendment process. This view is called “originalism”—the idea that law
has a meaning that is best captured by what the public understood it to
mean at the time it was enacted. In this view, the role of a judge is limited
to applying that meaning. Bork offered this view in contrast to those
who saw the judge as the custodian of a “living Constitution,” whose
protections for political minorities expand over time through judicial
decisions following the “arc of history.”
To my surprise and concern, the history of the early years of the
Republic seemed to suggest that the framers may have had something
like that latter view of a judge in mind. After all, “the judicial Power”
with which they were acquainted was formulated in England over centuries and involved judges trying to determine the just result, the fair
disposition, the equitable outcome.
This information created something of a faith crisis for me. What if
the framers’ understanding of the role of a judge was far different from
Bork’s? Bork was no historian, after all. Indeed, his work has been targeted by withering criticism on that very ground.12
12. For example, see the book review of Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America:
The Political Seduction of the Law (New York: Touchstone, 1990), in Bruce Ackerman,
“Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition,” Yale Law Journal 99, no. 6 (1990): 1419–39.
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My faith was restored, however, when I discovered the insight of
John F. Manning, now dean of Harvard Law School. In a clash of the
Titans, Manning and William Eskridge of Yale Law School, wrote dueling (and lengthy) articles in the Columbia Law Review on the public
understanding of the role of a judge in the earliest years of the Republic.13 Their debate is required reading in my class.
Here is my take on that debate. Eskridge seems to have the better of
the argument that the predominant view of the earliest judges in the
Republic is that “the judicial Power” was of the same sort that common
law judges in England had exercised. That power included the authority
to go beyond the express terms of the law and update legislative acts to
achieve what the judge believed was the purpose of the legislation. This
is a view similar to those who argue for a “living constitution.” But Manning wins the day, I think, by pointing out that regardless of the type of
judge the framers had in mind, the structure of government they created
left no room for a judge who would make law. Instead, the Constitution
created a government in which the determinations as to what is just, fair,
and equitable are made by We, the People, through their elected representatives in enacted law.
The unelected, life-tenured judiciary created by Article III plays no
role in making law under the Constitution’s scheme. The role of the
judge is to apply law made by elected representatives. In short, even if
the framers thought “the judicial power” under the Constitution would
allow for the common law judges with which they were familiar, the
structure of government they created left no oxygen for such judges.
Instead, the framers created a new type of judge.
I am reminded of the cartoon from my high school civics class titled
“How a Bill Becomes a Law.” (My children and grandchildren know its
more recent formulation, the song “I’m Just a Bill” in the movie Schoolhouse Rock.) There were no judges in the cartoon or song—a silent witness to a fundamental point that undergirds the Constitution. The most
pressing issue for the framers of the Constitution in 1787 was not which
rights of individuals were free from government interference. That was
an important question, to be sure, and was addressed largely by implication in the original Constitution and later by amendment. The most
13. John F. Manning, “Textualism and the Equity of the Statute,” Columbia Law
Review 101, no. 1 (January 2001): 1–127; William N. Eskridge Jr., “All About Words: Early
Understandings of the ‘Judicial Power’ in Statutory Interpretations, 1776–1806,” Columbia Law Review 101, no. 5 (June 2001): 990–1106.
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pressing issue for the framers in the summer of 1787 was “Who decides
the rules that govern the nation?” and they were careful to create separate spheres of decision making for the three branches of the federal
government.
In fact, judges who take it upon themselves to determine what the law
should be by their own refined sensibilities rather than acting as faithful
agents of the elected representatives do great damage to the form of government the Constitution created. The laws of the government the framers established would not be determined by a monarch or a prelate or a
body of wise people. They would be created according to a complicated
process that involved bicameral passage by different legislative bodies
representing different regional interests and presentment to a nationally
elected president. Under the Constitution, lawmaking is meant to be difficult, and it is a role reserved to Congress and the president, not judges.
The robed and unelected Article III judge who serves for life is an
odd duck in the Constitutional scheme. We are reminded of that during
every State of the Union address. The justices of the Supreme Court look
out of place amid the partisan ballyhoo. That is as it should be. Judicial
independence is a vital feature of the rule of law and is best achieved
when federal judges act, as Justice Felix Frankfurter said they must, as
“merely the translator of another’s command.”14 The command comes
from the law established by the political branches. The judge’s role is
to translate that command to the case at hand, not to advance his own
sense of what is just, fair, and equitable.
Which means that as a judge I would rule to strike down gun regulations I might favor as a private citizen because they run afoul of the
Second Amendment’s guarantee of the personal right to armed selfdefense.15 Or that my citizen’s sympathies for children dying of leukemia
couldn’t help me find a constitutional right for them to bypass the gauntlet for access to promising experimental drugs created by Congress.16 Or
that my interest as a citizen in finding out whether President Trump told
his White House counsel to obstruct justice should not lead me to grant
to the federal courts a power which they do not have to resolve a dispute
between Congress and the president.17 Without the guardrails on judges

14. Felix Frankfurter, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” Columbia Law
Review 47, no. 4 (May 1947): 534.
15. Parker, 478 F.3d 370; and Wrenn, 864 F.3d 650.
16. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695.
17. 951 F.3d 510 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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created by the Constitution’s separation of powers, my decision in each
of these cases (and others) would have been different.
III
There are four discrete procedural steps to the making of an Article III
judge. The president nominates, the Senate confirms, and the president
appoints. But the Constitution also requires that no judge can take office
until he has first sworn an oath. Oaths are mentioned three times in the
Constitution. The words of the president’s oath are set forth in the Constitution.18 Senators must take an oath before participating in an impeachment proceeding.19 And all state and federal officeholders, including
judges, must take an oath to support the Constitution.20 In fact, the first
act of the first Congress created the words of that oath, which have been
amended only rarely since then.
Today the Article III judge swears, with God as his or her witness
and help, to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich, . . . faithfully and impartially discharge
and perform all the duties incumbent upon me . . . under the Constitution and the laws of the United States,”21 and “that I support and defend
the Constitution . . . against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same.”22
In 2018, there was an extraordinary moment that played out in the
national media. President Donald J. Trump had criticized a decision
made by what he called “an Obama judge.” Immediately, Chief Justice
John G. Roberts Jr. rebuked the president, explaining, “We do not have
Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we
have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best
to do equal right to those appearing before them.”23 To President Trump,
judges were mere partisans whose loyalty, he assumed, should run to him.
The chief justice would not allow such a demeaning view of the judiciary
from the president of the United States to go unchallenged.

18. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
20. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 453.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 3331.
23. Adam Liptak, “Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence after Trump Attacks
‘Obama Judge,’ ” New York Times, November 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/
us/politics/trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html.
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I am with the chief justice. In my fifteen years on the D.C. Circuit,
I never once saw a judge cast a vote that I thought was tainted with partisan concerns. To be sure, we disagreed over how to interpret precedent,
the Constitution, statutes, regulations, treaties, and contracts. Those disagreements are vital to a collegial enterprise. But never did I see a colleague whose agenda was to advance the political aims of the president
who appointed him or her or the party to which he or she once belonged.
Each of my colleagues took seriously the oath to be impartial.24
Is it fanciful to think that something as fragile as an oath can work
to protect the structure of government created by the Constitution? Just
such a skeptic sent me an email to that effect in the wake of a controversial opinion I wrote with which he heartily disagreed. The opinion had
sided with the views of the Trump Justice Department in a politically
fraught matter: “You old pathetic fool,” the email began. “Do you honestly believe the Founding Fathers intended Presidents to be constrained
by oaths? I hope whatever [President Trump] has given you was worth
the time you’ll spend in hell.”
Upon the advice of the U.S. Marshals, I did not reply to the email, but
if I had, I would have said, “Yes, I really do believe the framers intended
that officeholders, including judges, would be constrained by oaths.”
And then I would have been sorely tempted to add, with a touch of selfrighteousness, no doubt, that my personal views of the matter did not
come into play in my decision.
I would then have quoted a famous passage from A Man for All Seasons, a dramatic portrayal of the martyrdom of St. Thomas More, the
patron saint of lawyers and politicians, executed by Henry VIII because
he took seriously the value of an oath. In this scene, the members of
More’s family have urged him to arrest Richard Rich, who they suspect
of ill intent:
Margaret [More’s daughter]: Father, that man’s bad.
More: There’s no law against that.
Roper [Margaret’s husband]: There is! God’s law.
More: Then God can arrest him.
...
Alice [More’s wife]: While you talk, he’s gone.
24. Justice Stephen Breyer has said the same about his service on the Supreme Court:
“Justice Breyer said he had not seen a decision influenced by politics in his 17 years on the
court.” Huetteman, “Breyer and Scalia Testify at Senate Judiciary Hearing.”
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More: And go he should if he were the Devil himself until he broke the law.
Roper: Now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a road through the law to get after
the Devil?
Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that.
More: Oh? And when the last law was down—and the Devil turned round
on you—where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast—Man’s laws, not God’s—
and if you cut them down—and you’re just the man to do it—d’you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? (Quietly) Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.25

I believe that the judicial oath requires a judge sometimes to give “the
Devil benefit of law.”
Recently, I revised the way I begin our class. Now I start with the
oath. We read about the history of the judicial oath, and then we parse
its words. Next, we watch the scene from episode 5 of season 1 of The
Crown, where the young Elizabeth hears from her father about the transformative power of the oath.26 Then we watch A Man for All Seasons.
But the highlight of this section of the course comes with a visitor.
Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
which sits in Cincinnati, Ohio, teaches a course on state constitutions
during the same term that I teach, and I ask him to come speak to my
class. But it is not state constitutions that I care about, so when Judge
Sutton finishes his lecture and leaves, I explain the reason for his visit.
He is, in my mind, the model Article III judge because he kept his oath
of office, and it cost him.
For years, thoughtful commentators had suggested that Judge Sutton
would be an ideal appointment to the Supreme Court. He has the perfect resume, having clerked on the Supreme Court and been the solicitor
general for Ohio before becoming a distinguished judge on an important
court. He is an extraordinary scholar and classroom teacher with a winning personality. But Judge Sutton wrote the opinion that the Supreme
Court overturned in Obergefell.27 Not that he is personally opposed to
25. Robert Bolt, A Man for All Seasons: A Drama in Two Acts (1960; New York: Samuel French, 1990), 56.
26. The Crown, season 1, episode 5, “Smoke and Mirrors,” directed by Stephen Daldry,
written by Peter Morgan, released November 4, 2016, Netflix, https://www.netflix.com/
title/80025678.
27. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), reversed in Obergefell v. Hodges,
576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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same-sex marriage (I have no idea as to his views on the matter), but he
did not think the Supreme Court’s precedents would allow a circuit court
to find that right in the Constitution. Judge Sutton also wrote an opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.28 Not that he
favored Obamacare as a policy (again, I have no idea about his views on
healthcare), but he did not think the Supreme Court’s precedents would
allow a circuit court to strike down this act of Congress. For those partisans who fail to see that the role of an Article III judge is to apply law as it
exists and not to advance the political aims of partisans with whom they
might agree as a citizen, Judge Sutton’s principled decisions disqualified
him from an appointment to the Supreme Court. Their misunderstanding of the role of a judge not only leaves the nation poorer but does great
damage to the structure of government the framers created. And they do
not understand the power of an oath.
Perhaps my email critic was right. Maybe human nature is such that
we cannot rely on an oath to keep judges within the narrow lane the Constitution creates for them. But I am betting otherwise. To the framers,
taking the oath was more than ceremony and ritual. It would transform
the oath taker into a judge whose primary loyalty when performing the
duties of his or her office was to the Constitution and the laws enacted by
Congress and not to any other commitment, be it his or her faith, family,
political views, the party that supported him or her, or the president who
appointed him or her.
Remember the joke about the quarrel between two disputants
over the proper form of Christian baptism? When one asked the other
whether she believed in baptism by immersion, she replied, “Yes. I’ve
even seen it done!” I believe in the power of the judicial oath to limit the
role of the Article III judge under the Constitution because I’ve seen it
done. By Judge Sutton. By my colleagues on the D.C. Circuit. By judges
throughout the nation.
IV
One of Abraham Lincoln’s favorite quotes was from Alexander Pope’s
Essay on Man: “Act well your part, there all the honor lies.”29 The wisdom
of that exhortation can be applied across many activities of life. It is at the
heart of Yuval Levin’s plea for “hope and renewal” in a badly fractured
28. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549–566 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J.,
concurring in part).
29. William Lee Miller, President Lincoln: The Duty of a Statesman (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 38–39.
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America whose institutions are in desperate need of repair.30 And it is
central to understanding the framers’ vision for the republic they created, but which they knew would be a daunting challenge to keep.31
The most fundamental freedom the framers created was the liberty
to make the laws by which society is governed. The people make those
laws through their elected representatives.32 The role of judge in this system is important, but limited. It is to follow the law, not to make it, and
to resist the temptation to replace the judgments of those elected by We,
the People with his or her own sensibilities.

Thomas B. Griffith was a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
from 2005 to 2020 and a member of President Biden’s Commission on the Supreme
Court in 2021. Currently, he is a fellow at the Wheatley Institution at Brigham Young
University, a lecturer on law at Harvard Law School, and special counsel at Hunton
Andrews Kurth LLP.

30. Levin, Time to Build, 199.
31. Dennis Rasmussen, Fears of a Setting Sun: The Disillusionment of America’s
Founders (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021).
32. See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (New York: Random
House, 2005), 10.
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